Applying the Rhythm Method to Afghanistan; It's Not Just For Teenage Boys

            In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, a war with Afghanistan was unavoidable unless the Taliban turned over Al Qaeda lock stock and barrel.  Many believed, including the Taliban, that Afghanistan was geographically isolated from any effective attack.  On October 7, 2001, however, that war was officially joined.  The American war effort in that country has suffered at various times from neglect, enduring a variety of strategies being employed, as well as, mission creep (which is the unexpected expansion of objectives).  It is that very mission creep that has kept the United States involved past the culmination point and there is now no hope to win that war.  This loss will ultimately be recorded as a failure of defining objectives, improper application of COIN strategies, and, finally, failing to recognize the culmination point.

            In the immediate aftermath of September 11^th the goals were simple: (1) Osama Bin Laden WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE; and (2) disband his organization.  When the Taliban government of Afghanistan decided to aid and abet Al Qaeda, deposing the Taliban was added to that list of goals.  The first and main objective of capturing or killing Bin Laden would prove difficult, in part, due to his familiarity with the geography, as well as, close personal ties.  The other part was the complicit neighboring government, Pakistan, hiding him in plain sight.  Finally, on  May 2, 2011, a date many of us remember where we were and what we were doing almost as vividly as September 11, Osama Bin Laden was killed.  The second goal was arguably met when Al Qaeda became virtually impotent, and reduced solely to self-preservation.  As time passed, however, Al Qaeda, developed an effective “road show” that has appeared in Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.  Again, as the Taliban take control back in various regions, Al Qaeda gains more places of refuge and freedom of movement.  It is likely the “Al Qaeda Road Show” is enjoying the recent success in Libya, when, on September 11, 2012, they attacked and killed the U.S. Ambassador.  While the Taliban were deposed fairly quickly, the effort has been losing ground ever since due to a failure of the Karzai government to gain legitimacy.   The Taliban influence has been on a slow and steady rise.  Today, the Taliban infiltrate or entice countless insider attacks on our troops.  Bin Laden’s death should have completed the hat trick; time to pack up and leave.  Yet, we are still there.

            So how did we end up with the “building a nation and a democracy” as objectives?  In order to be a principled nation, then it is right and proper to support burgeoning democracies wherever they are.  It is a reach for us, however, to expect that those democracies will mirror image our form of a democratic republic.  It has taken well over 200 years for American democracy to develop, and it certainly was not clear in the beginning that the country would survive.  Perhaps a pause is needed to correct the syntax.  Nation building usually addresses national identity; in other words, it comes from within.  While the U.S. uses it synonymously, often it is used to refer to state building, which address the infrastructure of a country. 

In the aftermath of World War II, the Allies found themselves occupying the devastated remains of the Axis powers.  These were once thriving, industrialized nations, now bombed to ruins.  There was a clear moral obligation, not to mention financial interest, to organize, support and assist in the reconstruction of Germany and Japan.  Afghanistan, however, was hardly industrialized and more closely resembled a Stone Age infrastructure.  Our modern airpower quickly dispensed with the handful of defense sites and runways, leaving it without traditional targets.  The targets of interest became ridges and tunnel entrances…stone targets.  Where is the moral mandate to build infrastructure that was not destroyed and, in fact, never existed?  Why stop there, should we install a science program as well?

In that vein, deposing the Taliban government did “break” their government.  Our desire to spread democracy should have been tempered with an understanding of the culture and the people.  Certainly on principle, democracy, even in its infancy, should be supported and encouraged.   At the start of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, however, agreements were made, and assistance provided to the Northern Alliance in order to complete the overthrow of the Taliban.  Acknowledgement of a long-standing cultural tradition was embraced through agreements within a tribunal system.  While the concept of installing a democracy is noble, the culture had no attachment to such a government, especially one that takes so much effort.  236 years later, we are still fighting the dismantling of our basic concepts with seemingly antipodal concepts like collective bargaining and open ballots, etc.

            Clausewitz said that “war is politics by other means” (Clausewitz, On War, p87).  War, according to Clausewitz, is simply another tool in a diplomatic toolbox alongside the State dinner, the harshly worded demarche, and embargos.  In that context, the original objectives and even the inclusion of deposing the Taliban are consistent.  Unlike during the Cold War when President Reagan called to “tear down this wall,” the United States has not been engaged in a deliberate political effort to change the form of government in Afghanistan.  The object was of no value to the American people.  Clausewitz’s Trinity also addresses the changing nature of war, but subjugates its outcome to the people, the leadership, and the armed forces (Clausewitz, p89).   Justification for an extremely long term goal of installing a democratic government seems counter to any real understanding of the American people and American politics, which will not tolerate such a long commitment for an object of so little value to the populous.  This is in stark contrast to the length of time it took to kill Bin Laden, where the value of the object was tremendous for the American people.  The people waited patiently, and celebrated triumphantly when Bin Laden was killed.

            In contrast, one could argue that rigid adherence to predefined objectives during Desert Storm forced leaders to the truce table before capitalizing on everything our military was gaining.  It could further be argued that failure greatly contributed to the long No Fly Zone enforcements, numerous truce violations, and a desire to complete the original effort; hence requiring the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The rigid adherence to pre-stated objectives was largely in response to the history lesson of Vietnam where a decade of mission creep obscured any real objectives.

            If the Bush administration had not been distracted by Iraq to the detriment of Afghanistan it might have all been a footnote.  When the administration did decide to pay attention to Afghanistan again, the nature of the war had seemingly changed.  It now, at least to the COIN advocates in the Marine Corps, had the appearance of Counter-Insurgency.  This more correctly draws a comparison to Vietnam.  Counter-Insurgency efforts have succeeded in places like Malaysia and the Philippines.  In fact, both the US success in the Philippines and the British success in Malaysia were accomplished with a minimum of forces and, therefore, losses.  More importantly, what each of those successes had in common was a legitimate government as an alternative to the insurgent forces.  Ramon Magsaysay was a popular President of the Philippines when the country was confronted with the 1954 Hukbalahap Rebellion.  He was able to seize the opportunity for necessary reforms and crush the communist insurrection within a year.  Hamid Karzai is no Magsaysay.  Like Vietnam, in the absence of a legitimate alternative, the people will favor the insurgency, and victory becomes a virtual impossibility.  The legitimate leadership prevailing is the Taliban.

            Again, Clausewitz advises, “beyond that point the scale turns and the reaction follows with a force that is usually much stronger than that of the original attack.  This is what we mean by the culminating point of the attack (Clausewitz, p 528).”  Napoleon proved the consequences of pressing the attack beyond the culmination point during his invasion of Russia.  While much of detecting the culmination point may be resigned to art, it is fairly clear that on May 2^nd, the United States achieved the original objectives.  In fact, the objective that remained was the establishment of a democracy, which is still a work in progress in our country 236 years later.  Referencing Clausewitz’s Trinity, it is highly doubtful that the American people had even another 10 years, yet alone 236, to see that objective to its conclusion.  While the culminating point may sometimes be hard to see, when you are desperate for an end and one happens along that meets all your original objectives then continued pursuit is clearly wrong.

            We have pressed this war beyond its culmination point by continuing past accomplishing the three original objectives that were of true value to the American people.  This is directly contrary to the advisements of Clausewitz.  The United States utilized a COIN strategy despite missing a dominant feature in order to succeed, that of a legitimate government.  The war in Afghanistan can have no other outcome at this point than defeat.  We can conduct “overtime” into perpetuity, but it will still be a loss.